Reservation Disestablishment: The Undecided Issue in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation by Risenhoover, Angela M.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 3 Energy Symposium 
Spring 1994 
Reservation Disestablishment: The Undecided Issue in Oklahoma 
Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation 
Angela M. Risenhoover 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Angela M. Risenhoover, Reservation Disestablishment: The Undecided Issue in Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 29 Tulsa L. J. 781 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss3/9 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
RESERVATION DISESTABLISHMENT: THE
UNDECIDED ISSUE IN OKLAHOMA TAX
COMMISSION v. SAC AND FOX NATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation1 represents a
great victory, not only for the Sac and Fox Nation,2 but for all Indian
tribes in Oklahoma. The primary issue in the case, addressed by this
note, is that of Indian country and reservation disestablishment. The
Supreme Court put an end to the argument repeatedly asserted by the
Oklahoma Tax Commission that there was some distinction between a
formal reservation and trust land.' The Court held "the McClanahan
presumption against state taxing authority applies to all Indian coun-
try, and not just formal reservations."4
While the Sac and Fox decision is favorable to the tribe, the court
left one issue undecided: "Whether the Sac and Fox Nation's reserva-
tion has been disestablished[5]."6 The Sac and Fox Nation contends
1. 113 S. Ct. 1985 (1993).
2. The Sac tribe originally inhabited the area now around eastern Michigan, but they mi-
grated to the Wisconsin area in the eighteenth century. 'The Fox tribe inhabited the area that is
now flinois. The tribes ultimately united in 1885 as the Sac and Fox Nation. Today, the people
of the Sac and Fox nation live in Iowa, Kansas, and Oklahoma. BILL YENNE, Ti ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN TmEs 67, 145 (1986).
3. In rejecting their argument the court stated: "Nonetheless, in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., we rejected precisely the same argument -
and from precisely the same litigant." Id. at 1991.
4. Id. at 1992.
McClanahan is the main case discussing the validity of state taxation in Indian Country.
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). Appellant, an enrolled mem-
ber of the Navajo tribe who lived on the Navajo reservation, brought suit for return of the
money that was withheld from her wages. Additionally, she sought a declaration that the state
tax was unlawful with regard to reservation indians. Id. at 166-67. Her income was derived from
employment within the Navajo reservation. Id. Relying on the concept of federal preemption,
the Court barred the state tax. Id. at 172. McClanahan established an almost per se rule against
state taxation in Indian Country, absent congressional authority to the contrary. Id. at 173-74.
While Sac and Fox originates from taxation issues, taxation became merely a side issue and
will not be discussed any further in this paper. Again, the main issue addressed in this paper is
Indian Country and Reservation Disestablishment.
5. The term "disestablished" will be used interchangeably with "terminated" and
"extinguished."
6. Another issue not decided by the Court concerned the taxation of non-tribal members,
an issue the Sac and Fox Nation wanted decided, however, certiorari was not granted by the
Supreme Court on that issue. Interview with William Rice, Attorney for the Sac and Fox Nation,
in Stroud, Okla. (Nov. 18, 1993).
1
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that its original 1867 reservation boundaries have never been termi-
nated.7 This issue raises many complex questions, but for now, one
can only speculate on what the answers will be.
II. INDIAN COUNTRY
A. Defining Indian Country
The concept of "Indian country" has undergone many changes
over the years.8 The current definition of "Indian country" contained
in the Federal Statutes states:
The term "Indian country", as used in this chapter, means (a)all
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the res-
ervation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders
of the United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits
of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.9
While this definition is contained in the criminal code, the Supreme
Court has applied the definition to civil jurisdiction as well.' 0
In United States v. John," the Court moved away from catego-
rizing the land at issue.'2 In addition to the statutory definition, the
court applied a test, originally adopted in United States v. Pelican,3
where the issue was whether the land in question "had been validly set
apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of
the Government."' 4
While the definition may seem clear, there has been much litiga-
tion over whether a particular tract of land constitutes "Indian
country."
7. Id.
8. FELIX S. CoHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 29-34 (Rennard Strickland
ed., 1982) [hereafter COHEN].
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
10. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,427 n.2 (1975). See also Moe v. Con-
federated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478-79 (1976).
11. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
12. ld. at 649.
13. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
14. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978) (quoting United States v. Pelican, 232
U.S. 442, 449 (1914)).
[Vol. 29:781
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B. Indian Country in Oklahoma
The issue of Indian country is even more clouded in Oklahoma
because of the lands' history.15 Prior to statehood, Oklahoma was di-
vided into two territories: Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory.' 6
Due to increased demand for land by white settlers, Congress passed
the Indian General Allotment Act. 7 Under the General Allotment
Act, the allottee receives an equitable and present usable estate in
land while the federal government retains legal title; legal title does
not pass to the allottee or his or her heirs until a fee patent has been
issued. Since the Five Civilized Tribes were excluded from the cover-
age of the General Allotment Act,'8 Congress later passed the Curtis
Act19 to force allotment of their tribal lands. The General Allotment
Act provided for "trust" allotments, and the Curtis Act provided for
"restricted" allotments.20
15. Prior to the establishment of Indian reservations, the land was, of course, home to nu-
merous indigenous tribes. See generally 1 JOSEPH B. THOBURN & MURIEL H. WmGrr,
OKLAHOMA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE AND ITs PEOPLE 21-25 (1929); 1 GASTON LrrrON, His-
TORY OF OKLAHOMA 72-89 (1957). In the Louisiana Purchase, the United States acquired the
land area including present-day Oklahoma. 1 THOBURN & WRIGHT, supra, at 109-110. Pursuant
to the westward expansion of the United States, an Indian Territory west of the Mississippi was
established and many eastern Indian tribes were removed to the land area now known as
Oklahoma. 1 THOBURN & WRIGHT, supra, at 121-30, 133-45, 163-76; 1 LITrON, supra, at 106-42;
see also Chadwick Smith & Faye Teague, The Response of the Cherokee Nation to the Cherokee
Outlet Centennial Celebration: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 29 TULSA LJ. 263 (1993); for a
pre-removal history of southern tribes, those generally removed to the new territory, see R.S.
CO'TERILL, TiE SOUTHERN INDIANS: THE STORY OF THE CMLIZED TRIBES BEFORE REMOVAL
(1954). As white settlement in the area increased, demands for theterritory's organization as a
state increased. 1 LrrToN, supra, at 474-504. Ultimately, the territory was granted statehood in
1907. Id. at 506-30.
16. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81.
Three-fifths of the Oklahoma Territory consisted of Indian reservations occupied by the
Cheyenne and Arapaho, Kiowa, Comanche and Apache, Osage, Kansas or Kaw, Potawatomi,
Kickapoo, Shawnee, Iowa, Sac and Fox, Pawnee, Ponca, Otoe and Missouri, Tonkawa and Wich-
ita. Ex Parte Nowabbi, 61 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Okla. Crim. App. 1936).
The Indian Territory consisted of the Five Civilized Tribes(Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, Sem-
inole, and Chickasaw) and the tribes of the Quapaw Agency. COhEN, supra note 7, at 773 (citing
Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81).
17. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-
334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354, 381 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). "Allotment was an assimilationist
policy designed to free tribal lands from communal ownership so that white settlers could home-
stead among individual Indian landowners." Oklahoma ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711
P.2d 77, 82 n.19 (Okla. 1985).
18. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1121-22 (D. D.C. 1976).
19. Curtis Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495.
20. Trust allotments are issued through a trust patent in which the government holds the
land for a period of years in trust for the allottee with an agreement to convey at the end of the
trust period. See Ex parte Nowabbi, 61 P.2d 1139, 1151 (Okla. Crim. App. 1936). Restricted
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The fact that all the Indian land in Oklahoma was subject to the
allotment process, combined with the different allotments which re-
sulted, lead to a somewhat unique history of Indian country in
Oklahoma. Due to these circumstances, many have attempted to ar-
gue that there is no Indian country in Oklahoma.21 Ex Parte
Nowabbi 2 involved the issue of whether a restricted allotment was
considered Indian country.23 Nowabbi was seeking to be discharged
from the State Penitentiary by writ of habeas corpus.24 He claimed
that the state courts were without jurisdiction because the offense for
which he was imprisoned was committed in Indian country.z- The
court concluded that there was no Indian country jurisdiction in the
area, once known as "Indian Territory," now Eastern Oklahoma. 26
The court based its decision, in part, on a 1906 amendment to the
General Allotment Act which failed to reserve to the federal courts
the jurisdiction to punish Indians in the Indian Territory for the crimes
enumerated in the Major Crimes Act2 .28
State v. Klindt29 expressly overruled Nowabbi. Klindt was an ap-
peal by the State of Oklahoma challenging a district court's dismissal
of charges against Klindt due to lack of jurisdiction.30  The Klindt
court concluded that the Nowabbi court had misinterpreted the stat-
utes and cases 31 and that Nowabbi was in direct conflict with the Sen-
eca-Cayuga holding that an allotment in eastern Oklahoma was Indian
country.32
21. This argument is usually based on one of two theories. First, allotment terminated all of
the reservations in Oklahoma, therefore, because there are no reservations there is no Indian
Country. E.g., United States v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 206 (1943); Ellis v. Page, 351
F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1965); Tooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1950). Alternatively,
the argument has been asserted that only trust allotments should be considered Indian Country.
E.g., United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467 (1926); Ex Parte Nowabbi, 61 P.2d 1139 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1936).
22. 61 P.2d 1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 1936).
23. Id. at 1151.
24. Id. at 1147.
25. Id. Nowabbi, a full-blood Choctaw Indian, was convicted of murdering Davison Hous-
ton, also a full blood Choctaw Indian. Id. The crime was committed on the Restricted Indian
Allotment of Davison Houston. Id.
26. Id. at 1154, 1156. See also State v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401, 403 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
28. Ex parte Nowabbi, 61 P.2d 1139, 1156 (Okla. Crim. App. 1936).
29. 782 P.2d 401, 404 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
30. Id. at 402. The alleged offense occurred at a smoke shop operated by the Delaware
Tribe. Id. The land was owned by a full-blood cherokee and held in trust by the United States.
Id.
31. Id. at 404.
32. Id. Seneca-Cayuga was an appeal by the State of Oklahoma from a district court's rul-
ing that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Oklahoma ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711
[Vol. 29:781
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In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 3 the
Supreme Court rejected the Oklahoma Tax Commission's argument
that there was a distinction between a "formal reservation" and allot-
ted land.3 4 Citizen Band Potawatomi involved the Oklahoma Tax
Commission's attempt to collect back taxes for cigarettes sold at a
convenience store located on trust land and owned and operated by
the Potawatomi tribe.3 5 The Oklahoma Tax Commission asserted that
the convenience store should be subject to State taxes because the
store was not located on a formal reservation, but merely on trust
land. 6 In rejecting this argument, the court stated: "[no] precedent of
this Court has ever drawn the distinction between tribal trust land and
reservations that Oklahoma urges. '37 In determining whether land is
Indian country, the question is "whether the area has been validly set
apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of
the Government. '38
The current line of cases seems to clearly establish that there is
Indian country in Oklahoma regardless of the existence of a "formal
reservation," a "trust" allotment, or a "restricted" allotment. How-
ever, there are those, including the Oklahoma Tax Commission, who
would still challenge this assertion.39
C. Legal Effect
Disputes over whether an area constitutes Indian country are
quite common, in fact it remains a constant battle between tribal and
state governments. The determination that a particular area is Indian
Country has many effects on the tribe and the state. There are polit-
ical, economic and social effects which flow from this decision.40
P.2d 77,78 (Okla. 1985). The state had attempted to enjoin certain tribes from conducting bingo
games. Id.
33. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
34. Id. at 511.
35. Id. at 507.
36. Id at 511.
37. Id-
38. Id. (citing United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978) and United States v. Mc-
Gowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938)).
39. The Oklahoma Tax Commission raises this exact argument in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Sac and Fox Nation. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1990
(1993).
40. Some of the many areas affected include taxing authority, environmental standards,
hunting and fishing rights, water rights, civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, criminal juridiction, Indian
gaming and adoption proceedings. Needless to say, this area is very complex and is beyond the
scope of this paper. For more detailed discussion one should look to the specific area of interest.
E.g., Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment.
Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Instrusion, 64 WASH. L. REv. 581
1994]
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Once it has been determined that an area constitutes Indian
country, the battle between the tribe and the state continues. The dis-
pute becomes one concerning who has authority in Indian country.
Under Worcester v. Georgia4 the legal effect was simple; the state was
held to have no authority in Indian country. Under the Worcester
rule, states have no authority in Indian country absent Congressional
authorization.4' However, over the years this rule has slowly disap-
peared, and state law seems to apply whenever the Supreme Court
says it does.43
The Supreme Court's departure from the Worcester rule causes
uncertainty in the determination of Indian country. Tribal and state
jurisdictional disputes are common. The disputes involve criminal as
well as civil jurisdiction, including tax and regulatory jurisdiction.
Criminal jurisdiction is dependent upon the type of crime committed
and whether non-Indians or Indians were involved. Civil jurisdiction
becomes even more complicated. The type of civil jurisdiction,
whether adjudicatory or regulatory, must first be determined. There
are also an array of factors which must be weighed in the process of
determining which government has jurisdiction. Some of these factors
include whether a person, usually involved in a dispute, is an Indian;
upon the ownership of the land involved" (indian or non-indian);
upon state interests; and upon tribal or federal interests.
The process of determining the jurisdictional authority in Indian
country is complicated and time consuming, and it also leads to a great
deal of uncertainty. What remains clear is that once an area is classi-
fied as Indian country, many problems arise in attempting to ascertain
whether the state or the tribe has jurisdiction.
(1989); Laurie Reynolds, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty and
Preemption, 62 N.C.L. REv. 743 (1984); Michael E. Connelly, Tribal Jurisdiction Under Section
1911(b) of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1878. Are the States Respecting Indian Sovereignty?, 23
N.M.L. RFv. 479 (1993); Thomas W. Clayton, The Policy Choices Tribes Face When Deciding
Whether to Enact a Water Code, 17 AM. INDIAN L. Rnv. 523 (1992).
41. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
42. Id.
43. While Worcester has never been explicitly overruled, states have been granted more and
more authority in Indian country recently. Some cases have made rules without ever mentioning
Worcester. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that the exer-
cise of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with the domestic depen-
dent status of the tribes); Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (upholding the
validity of New Mexico's severance taxes on oil production in Indian country); Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (holding that a state may tax sales to
non-Indians).
44. For discussion regarding non-Indian land ownership within Indian country, see notes
43-45, infra, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 29:781
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When determining whether a particular area is "Indian country,"
it should be noted that even land owned by non-Indians in fee simple
can still be considered "Indian country."'4 5 Non-Indian owned land is
considered Indian country if is located "within the limits of any Indian
reservation. ' 46 For this reason, it is important to know whether a par-
ticular area constitutes a reservation.
Once a reservation has been established, it remains a reservation
until Congress indicates otherwise.47 Difficulty in this area arises
where agreements and statutes have opened Indian reservations to
non-Indian settlement.48 The mere opening of a reservation does not
terminate the reservation nor the portion which has been opened.49
To determine whether a specific reservation has been disestablished, a
"congressional determination to terminate [must] ... be expressed on
the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances
and legislative history."5
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Sac and Fox Nation is a federally recognized tribe.5 ' Its tri-
bal headquarters is located on 800 acres reserved by the tribe pursuant
to the treaty of 1891.2 This land is held in trust by the United
States. 3 The tribe also owns other tracts of land in the area, as do
some of the tribal members.5 4 This land is also held in trust by the
United States.55
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1988).
46. Id.
47. Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1961) (quot-
ing United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909)).
48. COHEN, supra note 8, at 44.
49. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
50. Id. at 444 (citing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973)).
51. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1987 (1993).
52. Id. at 1988.
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The tribe imposes a tribal earnings tax56 and a motor vehicle
tax.57 The State of Oklahoma imposes a state income tax,58 motor
vehicle taxes59 and vehicle registration fees.60 The taxes imposed by
the tribe are not challenged. However, the taxing authority of the
Oklahoma Tax Commission is at issue.
The Sac and Fox Nation originally brought this action against the
Oklahoma Tax Commission in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma.61 The Tribe was seeking an injunction
to prevent the commission from enforcing the state income and motor
vehicles taxes against its tribal members, as well as others.62
Both parties have relied on McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission,63 which held that a state, absent an express authorization
from Congress, could not subject a tribal member living on the reser-
vation, and whose income was derived from reservation sources, to a
state income tax.64 The Sac and Fox made three alternative argu-
ments: 1) The 1867 reservation was never disestablished,65 2) The
1867 reservation was merely diminished, not disestablished,66 and 3)
Even if the Sac and Fox reservation was disestablished, there is still
Indian country consisting of tribal trust lands, dependent Indian com-
munities and Indian allotments.67 The Oklahoma Tax Commission ar-
gued, as it did in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi,68 that McClanahan applied only to tribes on established
56. "The earnings of any employee employed within tribal jurisdiction, whether or not that
employee is a member of the Tribe, are subject to the earnings tax." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1988 (1993) (quoting Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla.
Code of Laws, tit. 14, ch. 4, § 402).
57. The motor vehicle tax applies to "all motor vehicles owned by a resident of, and princi-
pally garaged within the jurisdiction of the Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma." Id. at
1988 (quoting Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians Okla. Code of Laws, tit. 14, ch. 8, § 802).
58. The statutes require all residents and nonresidents of Oklahoma who receive income in
the state to pay Oklahoma income tax. See OKL.A. STAT. tit., 68 § 2362 (1991) (explaining the
Oklahoma taxable income of a nonresident); id. § 2368 (detailing persons required to make re-
turns, income of estates and trusts, income of partnerships, returns by corporations, time for
returns, verification of returns and form of returns).
59. See Okla. Stat. tit. 47, §§ 1101-03 (1991 & Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, §§ 2101-04
(1991 & Supp. 1993).
60. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 2103 (1991).
61. Petitioner's Brief, Sac and Fox Nation (No. 92-259).
62. Id.
63. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
64. Id. at 165-66.
65. Respondent's Brief, Sac and Fox Nation (No. 92-259).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
8
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reservations.6 9 The Commission contended that the 1867 reservation
had been disestablished, and thus McClanahan was inapplicable. 70
In deciding the case, neither the District Court nor the Appellate
Court decided the issue concerning the existence of the 1867 reserva-
tion. 71 Their focus was solely on where the tribal members worked,
not where they lived.7 2 Using McClanahan and Citizen Band Potawat-
omi, the District Court concluded that because the tribal headquarters
was located on trust land, the state had no power to tax the tribal
members who worked there.73 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.74
IV. DECISION
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation,75 the
Supreme Court held that unless authorized by Congress, a state does
not have jurisdiction to tax in Indian country, regardless of "whether
the particular territory consists of a formal or informal reservation,
allotted lands, or dependent Indian communities. 76 The Court based
its decision on McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.77
The Commission argued, as it did in Oklahoma Tax Commission
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma,78 that the Mc-
Clanahan presumption against state taxation in Indian country only
applied to formal reservations.7 9 Once again, the Court rejected this
argument.80 The Supreme Court maintained that it has never drawn a
69. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1989 (1993).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1989-90. The appellate court gave the following reasoning for not deciding the
issue:
On appeal, the State asserts as error the district court's failure to determine the
status of the Sac and Fox Reservation. In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Pota-
watomi, we fail to see the relevancy of this issue....
[W]e therefore agree with the district court that the status of the Sac and Fox
Reservation is not a material issue in this case.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 967 F.2d 1425, 1428 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992).
72. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1989 (1993).
73. Id.
74. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Tribe, 967 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1992).
75. 113 S. Ct. 1985 (1993).
76. Id. at 1993.
77. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
78. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
79. Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. at 1990.
80. Id. at 1991.
1994]
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distinction with regard to reservations, but it stated that the issue is
merely whether the land is Indian country.81
While agreeing with the lower courts that the McClanahan pre-
sumption applied to all Indian country and not just formal reserva-
tions, the Court recognized an error in their decisions. In applying
McClanahan, the residence of the tribal member must be deter-
mined.' Of significance is not only where the members work but also
where they live.83 The Court remanded the case so that the lower
court can determine the residence of the tribal members.8 4 Thus, the
issue of whether the 1867 reservation has been disestablished will
need to be decided.
V. THE ISSUE ON REMAND: RESERVATION DISESTABLISHMENT
A. Uncertainty in the Law
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of reservation dises-
tablishment on several occasions.85 In Solem v. Bartlett,86 the Court
indicated that the precedents in the area of reservation disestablish-
ment had created a "fairly clean analytical structure" to aid in deter-
mining whether a reservation has been disestablished. 87 The key in
determining whether a particular reservation has been disestablished
is congressional intent.88 Three distinct factors are important in deter-
mining congressional intent: (1) statutory language, (2) surrounding
circumstances, and (3) subsequent treatment. 89
Statutory language is the most probative evidence of congres-
sional intent.90 When looking at the statute, it is important to examine
the language regarding the unallotted opened lands and the manner in
81. ld (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505, 511
(1991)).
82. ld at 1991.
83. Id
84. Id. at 1993.
85. E.g., Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1961) (hold-
ing Colville Indian Reservation is still in existence); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) (hold-
ing Klamath River Reservation was not terminated); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975) (holding Lake Traverse Indian Reservation was terminated); Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding Rosebud Sioux Reservation boundaries were dimin-
ished); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (holding Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation was
not disestablished).
86. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
87. Id. at 470.
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which the statute provides for compensation to the tribe for the
opened land.91
Examples of clear language of an intent to terminate a reserva-
tion include: "the Smith River reservation is hereby discontinued,"
"the same being a portion of the Colville Indian Reservation ... is
hereby, vacated and restored to the public domain," and "the reserva-
tion lines of the said Ponca and Otoe and Missouria Indian reserva-
tions be, and the same are hereby, abolished."'92 Additionally, an act
stating: "[t]he... Indians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to
the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest.. ." indicated
an intent to terminate a reservation.93 The language of an act is insuf-
ficient to evidence an intent to terminate a reservation when it does
no more than open the way for non-Indians to own land on the reser-
vation.94 For example, language stating reservation lands were "sub-
ject to settlement, entry, and purchase" merely opens reservation land
for non-Indian ownership and does not disestablish the reservation. 95
Lastly, language authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to "sell and
dispose" of Indian land is not sufficient to terminate a reservation.96
Secondly, with respect to statutory language, the manner in which
a statute compensates a tribe for opened land is significant for a deter-
mination of disestablishment.97 The Court seems to place emphasis
on two methods. The first method is where the tribe is given a "sum-
certain" for the unallotted land. In other words, the tribe is paid a set
amount to compensate the tribe for all of the unallotted land. The
second method involves payment to the tribe as the lands are sold.
This method involves establishing a fund dependent on uncertain fu-
ture sales of its land to settlers. Payment of a sum certain to the tribe
indicates an intent to terminate the reservation, but payment that is
contingent on future sales usually indicates an intent not to termi-
nate.98 Language signifying an intent to terminate a reservation, com-
bined with a one-time payment to the tribe for a sum certain creates,
91. Id.
92. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 n.22 (1973).
93. Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975).
94. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,497 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State
Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 356 (1962).
95. Mattz, 412 U.S. at 495.
96. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472-73 (1984).
97. It is unclear why the method of payment signifies the intent of Congress regarding
whether a particular reservation has been terminated.
98. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1977) (holding reservation was
terminated where there was express language regarding termination, payment for a sum-certain,
and tribal consent to the agreement); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) (holding reservation
11994]
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"an almost insurmountable presumption that Congress meant for the
tribe's reservation to be diminished."99
The second factor used to determine Congressional intent encom-
passes the circumstances surrounding the passage of the act.1' ° The
most important surrounding circumstances are the manner in which
the transaction was negotiated and its legislative history.10'
When analyzing the transaction, the Court seems to be looking at
whether there was tribal consent. In DeCoteau, where the reservation
was found to have been terminated, the Court found importance in
the fact that the tribe consented to the agreement.102 However, in
Rosebud Sioux, there was no tribal consent, and the reservation was
still disestablished. 0 3 Although tribal consent is ostensibly one of the
circumstances to be looked at, it remains unclear when the Court will
find it important.
Legislative history is the second most important element of the
circumstances surrounding a transaction. The clearest case is when
the legislative history states the effect of a specific act on a reserva-
tion's boundaries. However, the clearest case is generally unavailable;
at the time the surplus land acts were passed, the issue of reservation
termination seemed unimportant, thus the debate usually centered
around other aspects of the agreement."° To complicate the determi-
nation, a showing of mere congressional hostility to the continued res-
ervation status of a particular tract of land is insufficient to indicate an
intent to terminate. 5 One such openly hostile Congress,0 6 neverthe-
less rejected several bills explicitly proposing reservation
termination.'07
was not terminated where there was no express language regarding termination of the reserva-
tion nor a sum-certain payment); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368
U.S. 351 (1962) (holding reservation was not terminated where there was no express language
regarding termination of reservation nor a sum-certain payment); but see Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding reservation was terminated where there was arguably lan-
guage regarding termination, but no payment for a sum certain nor tribal consent).
99. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 448.
103. Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 584.
104. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 (1984).
105. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 499 (1973).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 504-05. 'These bills unequivocally provided for reservation disestablishment. For
example, one bill proposed that the Klamath River Reservation, "be, and the same is hereby,
abolished." Id. at 500.
[Vol. 29:781
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The final factor used to determine Congressional intent is subse-
quent treatment. Subsequent treatment includes the manner in which
the area in question was treated by Congress, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and local judicial authorities, as well as, who actually moved
onto the land and whether the area retains its Indian character.'08 Ex-
press recognition of the continued existence of specific reservations by
Congress and the Department of the Interior in subsequent statutes,
of course, supports the continued existence of a reservation.10 9 In
contrast, a state's unquestioned exertion of jurisdiction over an area
and a predominantly non-Indian population and land use supports a
conclusion of reservation disestablishment." 0 However, subsequent
treatment may not always be clear, as both DeCoteau and Solem illus-
trate; problems occur where there is treatment that supports both dis-
establishment and continued existence of a reservation."' When this
type of ambiguity exists, subsequent treatment cannot support a find-
ing of disestablishment.
While the analytical structure given in Solem seems to be quite
simple, its application evidences the law's uncertainty. In Seymour,
Mattz, and DeCoteau, the test seemed to be consistently applied." 2
However, the application of the test in Rosebud Sioux, reveals the
uncertainty. In DeCoteau, the Court placed importance on the pay-
ment for a sum-certain and tribal consent to find a reservation termi-
nated.1 3 However, in Rosebud Sioux, both sum-certain payment and
consent were absent, and the Court still found that the reservation
had been disestablished because of the language and subsequent treat-
ment.114 In discussing these factors the Court said that they were not
dispositive, but merely considerations to be used when evaluating the
108. Solem, 465 U.S. at 468-69.
109. Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 356 (1961) (hold-
ing Colville Indian Reservation still exists); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973) (holding
Klamath River Reservation still exists).
110. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604-05 (1977) (noting over 90 percent of
the area's population were non-Indians).
111. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 442-44 (1975); Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463, 470-72 (1984).
112. In Seymour, relying on language which merely opened the surplus land for settlement,
the fact that there was no sum-certain payment, and subsequent recognition of the reservation
by Congress, the Court held that the reservation was still in existence. Seymour, 368 U.S. at 359.
In Mattz, relying on the same type of factors present in Seymour as well as legislative history
which indicated that termination of the reservation had been previously rejected by Congress,
the Court again held that the reservation still existed. Mattz, 412 U.S. at 506. In DeCoteau,
relying on "cede, sell, and convey" language, payment of a sum-certain, and tribal consent, the
reservation was found to be disestablished. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445-449.
113. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 448.
114. Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 587.
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surrounding circumstances. 115 Moreover, the Court stated: "although
the Acts ... were unilateral Acts of Congress ... that fact does not
have any direct bearing on the question of whether Congress by these
later Acts did intend to diminish the Reservation Boundaries. '116
Furthermore, when the Court, in Rosebud Sioux, examined the legis-
lative history, its examination included the history of the act which,
although would have terminated the reservation, was expressly re-
jected by Congress." 7 The disparity with Rosebud Sioux is not only
clear on its face, but is formally recognized by a dissenting opinion
supported by three Justices. 18
The Court's analysis in Solem seems to give a somewhat "clean
analytical structure," however this is misleading. The Court's "clean
analytical structure" is based on Congressional intent; the idea that
one can obtain an objective meaning to a statute or treaty from Con-
gressional intent is a fallacy." 9 As the precedent in this area illus-
trates, this so called "clean analytical structure" allows the court to
pick and choose which factors will be decisive, and these factors will
not be the same in every case.' 20 The absence of a more definitive test
and allowing the court to re-determine which factors are decisive pro-
duces a great deal of uncertainty.
115. Id. at 598 n.20.
116. Id. at 587.
117. Id. at 592.
118. The dissenting opinion states:
Until today, the effect on reservation boundaries of Acts disposing of surplus res-
ervation land was well settled. The general rule, entitled to "the broadest possible
scope," is that in interpreting these Acts "legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit
of the Indians." * * * Today, however, the Court obliterates this distinction, and, by
holding against the Tribe when the evidence concerning congressional intent is palpably
ambiguous, erodes the general principles for interpreting Indian statutes.
Id. at 617-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. The Court's reliance on congressional intent causes uncertainty no matter what issue is
involved. The mere idea of congressional intent is deceiving because the assumption underlying
this idea is that Congress, a politically diverse group, can possess a common intent. See Kenneth
A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INr'L REV.
LAW & ECON. 239, 249 (1992) ("[I]t is still fruitless to attribute intent to the product of their
collective efforts. Individual intents, even if they are unambiguous, do not add up like vectors.")
(emphasis original). The fact that factors are needed to discern congressional intent also indi-
cates the ambiguity that exists in using congressional intent.
120. Compare DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (using payment of a
sum certain and tribal consent as a basis for terminating a reservation) with Rosebud Sioux ribe
v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding even in absence of a sum certain and tribal consent a
reservation had been terminated).
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B. The Law's Application in Sac and Fox
Neither the lower federal courts nor the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of disestablishment in Sac and Fox, therefore the
question of whether the Sac and Fox Reservation was disestablished
remains, at least temporarily, unanswered. For the moment, one can
only hypothesize as to what the answer will be, but any hypothesis
requires an application of the purported test.
A proper analysis begins with the first factor, the language of the
relevant statute. The Sac and Fox Allotment Agreement states:
"[t]he Sac and Fox Nation hereby cedes, conveys, transfers, surrenders
and forever relinquishes to the United States of America, all their ti-
tle, claim or interest, of every kind or character, in and to the follow-
ing described tract of land...."'2 ' The agreement also provides for a
sum-certain payment of $485,000.00 to the tribe for the opened
land.122
The Oklahoma Tax Commission, relying heavily on the DeCoteau
decision, urges that the presence of these factors support its conten-
tion that the original Sac and Fox Reservation was terminated by the
Sac and Fox Allotment Agreement.'" The Sac and Fox Nation re-
sponds to this "cede, sell, and convey" argument by asserting that the
language is ambiguous. 24 This assertion is based on the fact that the
language used in the Allotment Agreement is similar to earlier trea-
ties, with the Sac and Fox, using the same type of language wherein
their reservation was not extinguished.'25 Construing the language in
light of the earlier agreements, the Sac and Fox Nation maintains that
the language is ambiguous and thus must be interpreted in favor of
the tribe.126 The Sac and Fox Nation further questions the relevancy
121. Act of February 13, 1891, ch. 165, 26 Stat. 749, 750.
122. Petitioner's Brief, Sac and Fox Nation (No. 92-259).
123. Id.
124. Respondent's Brief, Sac and Fox Nation (No. 92-259).
125. Id. See also Respondent's Brief, Sac and Fox Nation (No. 92-259) (citing Treaty with the
Sac and Fox, Nov. 3, 1804, 7 Stat. 84 ("[The Sac and Fox] do hereby cede and relinquish forever
to the United States, all the lands included within the above-described boundary.")); Treaty with
the Sac and Fox, July 15, 1830,7 Stat. 328 ("But it is understood that the lands ceded and relin-
quished by this Treaty, are to be assigned and allotted under the direction of the President... to
the Tribes now living thereon, or to such other Tribes as the President may locate thereon for
hunting, and other purposes."); Treaty with the Sac and Fox, Sept. 21, 1832, 7 Stat. 374 ("Out of
the cession made in the preceding article, the United States agree to a reservation for the use of
. tribes. . . ."); Treaty with the Sac and Fox, May 6, 1861, 12 Stat. 1171 (containing "cede,
relinquish, and convey" language, but not terminating the reservation).
126. Respondent's Brief, Sac and Fox Nation (No. 92-259).
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of a sum-certain provision in a determination of congressional intent
to terminate a reservation. 127
The "cede, sell, and convey" language used in the Sac and Fox
Agreement combined with the sum-certain payment seems to present
a strong argument in favor of disestablishment. The Court has held
that "cede, sell, and convey" language was sufficient to indicate con-
gressional intent to disestablish a reservation.128  However, not all
"cede, sell, and convey" language convincingly indicates a Congres-
sional intent to disestablish. 129 Furthermore, the presence of these
two factors - language of cession and sum-certain payment - cre-
ates "an almost insurmountable presumption that Congress meant for
the tribe's reservation to be" terminated;13 0 possibly the presumption
may be overcome. Finally, the Court in Rosebud Sioux stated that
sum-certain payment is merely a factor to be considered and should
not be dispositive one way or the other.' 31
Application of the second factor requires an examination of the
surrounding circumstances including legislative history and the nature
of the negotiations. The Tax Commission contends that Congress'
policy, at the time of the Sac and Fox agreement, was intended to
disestablish and individualize all of the reservations in Indian Terri-
tory with the ultimate goal of creating the State of Oklahoma.13 This
contention concerning the policy during allotment is wrong.133 The
general policy of an allotment act 3 4 "was to continue the reservation
127. Interview with William Rice, Attorney for the Sac and Fox Nation, in Stroud, Okla.
(Nov. 18, 1993); Respondent's Brief at 15, Sac and Fox Nation (No. 92-259).
128. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 439-40 (1974).
129. Justice Douglas has written:
Congress in the very Act that opened the instant reservation opened several other res-
ervations also. But as respects them it used different language. In contrast to the in-
stant reservation, one other tribe agreed to "cede, relinquish, and forever and
absolutely surrender to the United States all their claim, title and interest of every kind
and character in and to" a described tract. Another agreed to "cede, sell, and relin-
quish to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and to all that portion" of
a named reservation as specifically described. Another agreed to sell to the United
States "all that portion" of the reservation described by metes and bounds. Congress
made an unmistakable change when it came to the lands ceded in the instant case.
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 463-64 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
130. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1984) (emphasis added).
131. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 598 n.20 (1977).
132. Petitioners's Brief, Sac and Fox Nation, (No. 92-259).
133. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,496 (1973) (stating policy of allotment was not immediate
termination of reservations).
134. E.g., Act of June 17, 1892, 27 Stat. 52.
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system and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot tracts to indi-
vidual Indians for agriculture and grazing.' 1 35 The Sac and Fox Na-
tion contends that the nature of the transaction calls for interpreting
the language in favor of the tribe.136 Further, the Sac and Fox Nation
asserts that the Sac and Fox representatives were illiterate and unso-
phisticated, and the government merely gave them an ultimatum.137
Because they characterize the agreement as a contract of adhesion,
the Sac and Fox Tribe argues that it should be interpreted strictly
against the government in favor of the tribe. 38
The final factor concerns the subsequent treatment of the area in
question. The Oklahoma Tax Commission does not discuss this factor.
The Sac and Fox, on the other hand, refer to the subsequent treatment
and recognition of the reservation by the Department of the Interior
and the Sac and Fox National Council in support of their position. 39
It would appear, based on the Sac and Fox Nation's arguments,
that the Oklahoma Tax Commission will have to come up with some
stronger arguments on remand. However, this assumption is based on
the idea that the Court will strictly follow the law and realistically, it
may not. First, whether right or wrong, the effects of this decision are
too important for the Court not to consider them in deciding the issue
of whether the Sac and Fox Reservation has been extinguished.
Moreover, the current test allows the Court to determine the desired
outcome, then use the test to support the decision. Therefore, it is
inevitable that the Court will not reinstate the original boundaries of
the Sac and Fox Nation because of the complications which would
135. Mattz, 412 U.S. at 496.
136. Respondent's Brief, Sac and Fox Nation (No. 92-259).
137. Id. at 16.
138. Id. In contending that the treaty was nothing more than a contract of adhesion, the Sac
and Fox Nation argued not only that the Sac and Fox representatives were "illiterate and unso-
phisticated" but also that Congress merely issued an ultimatum to the representatives and fur-
ther, that Congress "knew exactly" how to disestablish the reservation had it intended to do so.
Id. A fundamental premise of the traditional theory of contract is that each party is not only
aware of the substance of a contract but can successfully protect his or her interests; where this
premise does not hold, the contract is one of adhesion. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhe-
sion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. Rv. 629 (1943). Generally,
contracts of adhesion are presented exactly as an ultimatum - on a "take it or leave it" basis.
See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. Rlv. 1173
(1983). Although Professor Rakoff analyzes contracts of adhesion in the commercial context, he
contends that the legal system's determination to enforce contracts of adhesion is a question of
the "genera[tion] and alloca[tion] of power," id. at 1229-45, and concludes that certain form
terms should be "presumptively unenforceable," id. at 1258.
139. Id. at 15 ("[T]he Interior Department and the Sac and Fox National Council, from the
time of the Allotment Agreement through at least 1915, acted consistently with the notion that
the 1867 Reservation boundaries had not been extinguished.").
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arise if the entire area was considered "Indian country."'140 It is likely
that the Court's decision will be a compromise between the requests
of each party. Nevertheless, it remains unclear where, between the
two extremes, the Court's decision will ultimately fall.
VI. CONCLUSION
As one can see from the case law, challenging the existence of a
reservation is not a new issue. However, in Oklahoma, the assump-
tion has generally been that there are no Indian reservations. 14 1 This
assumption has gradually begun to disappear. 42 With the demise of
this assumption, new cases raising the issue of reservation disestablish-
ment are likely to surface.
The extent of the existence of reservations in Oklahoma is still
uncertain. Because the area now comprising Oklahoma once con-
sisted almost entirely of Indian reservations, 43 many are anxiously
awaiting the outcome of the Court's decision in Sac and Fox. Many
Indian tribes in Oklahoma would like to see their original reservation
boundaries restored. There are those who believe that many of these
tribes have very strong arguments to support their positions. Whether
these tribes will follow the lead of the Sac and Fox Nation in re-
claiming their reservations boundaries remains to be seen.
The outcome in Sac and Fox is important, not only to the parties
involved, but to everyone in Oklahoma. While everyone anxiously
awaits a decision, it could be years before a final determination is
made. But, even if the Sac and Fox Nation fails to obtain its ultimate
goal, there are many tribes waiting in line to bring their own claims.
Angela M. Risenhoover
140. See discussion, supra part II., subsection C., on the legal effect of determination that
land is Indian country.
141. See Kirke Kickingbird, "Way Down Yonder in the Indian Nations, Rode My Pony Cross
the Reservation!" From "Oklahoma Hills" by Woody Guthrie, 29 TULSA LJ. 303, 332-38 (1993)
(discussing various misconceptions regarding the status of Indian country in Oklahoma).
142. See id. at 338-43.
143. See, e.g., 1 THOBUm.N & WRIGH, supra note 15, at 219-50.
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